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Agenda items 22, 25, 26, 27, 29, 61, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 103, 105, 106 and 107

Final review and appraisal of the implementation of the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s

United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations

Follow-up to the outcome of the special session on children

Implementation of the outcome of the World Summit for Social Development and of the twenty-fourth special session of the General Assembly

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Restructuring and revitalization of the United Nations in the economic, social and related fields

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Implementation of the first United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (1997-2006)

Globalization and interdependence

Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries

High-level international intergovernmental consideration of financing for development



Letter dated 13 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit, herewith, the Final Communiqué adopted by the thirty-second Meeting of the Chairmen/Coordinators of the Chapters of the Group of 77, held in Geneva, on 14 and 15 February 2002.

On behalf of the Group of 77, I would appreciate it if the Final Communiqué annexed to the present letter could be circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly under agenda items 22, 25, 26, 27, 29, 61, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 103, 105, 106 and 107.

(Signed) Ambassador Milos **Alcalay**
Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United Nations
Chairman of the Group of 77

Annex to the letter dated 13 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Final communiqué adopted by the thirty-second Meeting of Chairmen/Coordinators of the Chapters of the Group of 77, Geneva, 14-15 February 2002

1. Meeting at the United Nations Office at Geneva on 14 and 15 February 2002 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Milos Alcalay (Venezuela), the Chairmen of the Group of 77 Chapters adopted the following communiqué:
2. This meeting is taking place at a moment when the United Nations system is preparing to address at the highest political level issues of great concern to developing countries as part of the Millennium Declaration, which provides a political global vision on both economic and social dimensions. They relate, in particular to financing for development, food security sustainable development, ageing and children. Indeed, the world economy is in fragile health, with unemployment rising again in many countries. Recoveries in a number of developing economies have stalled as markets for their exports have weakened.
3. The objectives for poverty and illiteracy eradication are far from being attained. The external debt is still a huge burden for the developing world. Commodity dependent economies, which include some of the poorest economies, can now see little prospect of reversing years of unfavourable price trends for their exports. The use of non-tariff barriers remains an obstacle to the trade of the developing countries. In today's globalizing world, we recognize that economic trouble is likely to reverberate much further and deeper than in the past, with the weakest economies being most vulnerable.
4. Regardless of exactly when and at what pace recovery comes to the world economy, we insist on global economic responses to the problems of systemic imbalances and vulnerabilities. In many respects, the biggest challenges, facing developed and developing countries alike, involve questions of policy coherence and coordination. Progress here is hampered by weaknesses in multilateral arenas. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the restructuring and democratization of the multilateral financial institutions.
5. Although agreement in Doha was of tremendous symbolic value in the face of mounting global anxieties, tackling biases and asymmetries in the trading system remains the real challenge. The faithful implementation of commitments made by our developed partners during the Uruguay Round, and more recently in Doha, is essential to enable developing countries to be fully integrated in the multilateral trading system. We are clear that in both these areas, developing countries cannot allow development agendas to be determined by interested parties in the North. It is therefore imperative that we look to forge a common front at the upcoming meetings in Monterrey as well as in the context of the future work generated in Doha from the fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO.

International Conference on Financing for Development

6. We commend the preparatory process on financing for development and fully endorse the convening of the international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, at the highest political level, including at the summit level. We reiterate our gratitude to the Government of Mexico for its generous offer to host this conference and stress the importance of the substantive agenda of the International Conference on Financing for Development.

7. The upcoming High-level Intergovernmental Conference on Financing for Development offers a unique opportunity for devising a coherent and concerted approach to solve the problem of the shortage of resources for development. Domestic resource mobilization is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a successful development process. Since development is also strongly conditioned by the external environment, it is also necessary to address global demand conditions, terms of trade, the stability of the international monetary and financial system and the adequacy of external financing. Given the interdependence between trade and finance, greater access of developing countries to Northern markets for resource- and labour-intensive products will have significant implications for closing the gap between the need for and the availability of external finance for development.

8. Additional resources are particularly needed to address the supply constraints that impede developing countries from taking advantage of the new export opportunities in the international trading system. Equally important is the reform of the international financial system, with a view to strengthening mechanisms to prevent and adequately manage financial crises, including a greater involvement of the private sector, and to remedy systemic deficiencies in the current regime for capital flows and exchange rates. In this context, the role and governance of the multilateral financial institutions need to be reviewed, so as to improve the participation of developing countries in the decision-making process. Moreover, any debate on a new approach to financing for development has to address the issues of adequacy of official development assistance and the need for more appropriate debt relief for the poorest countries.

9. In light of the increasing importance of foreign direct investment in the world economy, we look forward to an UNCTAD contribution to the follow-up and implementation of the outcome of the Monterrey Consensus particularly with respect to the chapters relating to mobilization of international resources for development — foreign direct investment and international trade and systemic issues.

World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting Follow-up/Post-Doha

10. We call on all WTO members to honour their commitments towards effectively meeting the concerns of developing countries in the post-Doha negotiating process, in particular in the following areas:

- The operationalization of the special and differential treatment provisions and mandates;
- The meaningful improvement of market access conditions for exports of interest to developing countries in agriculture, services and industrial products;

- The implementation issues, that involve unsolved problems since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round;
- The issues of trade, debt and finance, and trade and transfer of technology;
- The review of the WTO rules to make them more responsive to the needs and conditions of all the developing countries.

11. We recognize the needs of developing countries, in particular least developed countries, for enhanced support for technical assistance and capacity-building in this area, including policy analysis and development, so that they may effectively participate in the negotiating process launched at Doha and ensure that it delivers its expected development promises. To this end, we emphasize the need for strengthened timely and adequately resourced assistance to respond to these needs, as specified throughout the text of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. We urge the WTO to enhance its cooperation with other international and regional agencies involved in the area of trade, in particular with UNCTAD in view of its specific mandate on trade and development within the framework of the United Nations system and urge donors to provide the necessary additional financial support to these agencies in order to allow them to meet the needs of developing countries.

Least developed countries

12. We reiterate our strong support for the full and effective implementation of the various commitments and actions contained in the Brussels Programme of Action and urge all stakeholders to honour their respective commitments in this regard. The Group is extremely encouraged to note that, in contributing towards the implementation of the Programme of Action and within its mandates and competence, UNCTAD has undertaken important implementation related activities on least developed countries since the third United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries held in Brussels last year. We call on the UNCTAD secretariat to continue its efforts in the implementation of the plan of action in the area of its main functions such as research and policy analysis, technical cooperation and capacity-building.

13. We join the concern expressed by UNCTAD member States with respect to the negative impact on UNCTAD's analytical and technical work resulting from the transfer of posts out of UNCTAD to the new Office of the High Representative on least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States as well as the reduced overall level of resources, in particular consultancy funds, allocated to UNCTAD for 2002-2003.

14. We place the highest importance on the full implementation of paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 56/227 of 24 December 2001 calling for enhancing the operational capacity of UNCTAD. In this regard, full consideration should also be given to the additional activities for UNCTAD generated by the outcomes of the fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting. Thus, we consider as high priority the preparation and the examination by the General Assembly at its March resumed session of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on enhancing UNCTAD's operational capacity.

UNCTAD Mid-term Review

15. We welcome the initiative of the Government of Thailand and of the Trade and Development Board to organize the UNCTAD Mid-term Review in Bangkok from 29 April to 3 May 2002. The Mid-term Review proves to be a useful tool to assess the implementation of commitments adopted by member States at UNCTAD X as well as to respond in a timely fashion to the new concern of Governments. Results, usefulness and making a real contribution to the advancement of developing countries are key goals of this process. We noted with satisfaction the attention paid by the Mid-term Review to improving the ongoing activities of UNCTAD, which are of greatest importance to the development process in our countries and to efforts made to mainstreaming in UNCTAD activities the outcome of the Doha Ministerial Meeting, in particular its development dimension. In this regard satisfaction was also expressed with the UNCTAD "Programme of technical assistance and capacity building for developing countries, especially least developed countries, and economies in transition in support of their participation in WTO Doha work programme". We invited donors and all relevant organizations to extend their support to all UNCTAD activities.

World Summit on Sustainable Development

16. We reaffirm our commitment to the success of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, to be held in Johannesburg from 26 August to 4 September 2002 and our active participation in the preparatory process. We emphasize that the Summit should ensure the full implementation of the Rio principles, particularly the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, and Agenda 21. The endeavours of developing countries to achieve the goals of sustainable development should be supported by the international community.

17. The need for providing adequate means of implementation to developing countries cannot be overemphasized. The Summit should agree on time-bound targets in providing the means of implementation and should clearly identify the sources of finance and technology required in this regard. We encourage major groups to actively pursue partnerships for the effective and expeditious implementation of Agenda 21. We hope that the Summit will result in renewed political commitment to the goals of sustainable development.

World Food Summit

18. We welcome the decision of the one hundred and twentieth session of the FAO Council to postpone the World Food Summit: five years later from November 2001 to 10 through 13 June 2002. The World Food Summit: five years later will aim for a reaffirmation of commitment to the Rome Declaration on World Food Security and to the World Food Summit Plan of Action, the two documents adopted at the Summit.

19. We strongly welcome a global coalition or alliance to fight hunger, as was proposed during the FAO Conference in November 2001.

20. In 1996, during the World Food Summit, Heads of State, Governments and other high-level representatives from 185 countries had pledged their political will and their commitment to achieve food security for all and to an ongoing effort to

eradicate hunger in all countries, with an immediate view to reducing the number of undernourished people to half their present level no later than 2015.

21. We regret that FAO's latest assessment of the global food security situation is a stark reminder of the slow progress towards the reduction of hunger. Today, hunger affects 800 million people, of which 200 million are children. It is therefore all the more crucial that countries take measures to accelerate the pace of hunger reduction.

22. We believe that only through the direct involvement of decision makers will it be possible to mobilize the necessary political will and ensure that vital decisions are taken by leaders in a position to influence policy at every level. Therefore, we encourage worldwide representation at the highest level at the World Food Summit: five years later.

23. We welcome the establishment of a trust fund for food security and food safety by FAO with a target of US\$ 500 million, and we recommend wide participation of developed and developing countries in this trust fund as a sign of the reaffirmation of their commitment to the eradication of hunger.

Other forthcoming conferences

24. We welcome the positive preparatory processes of the forthcoming summits and conferences such as the special session of the General Assembly on children, the second World Assembly on Ageing, United Nations Forum on Forests to which we attach high political importance. We hope that these conferences will contribute to a greater understanding of the development problems of the developing countries, help evolve a global consensus and mobilize adequate resources to address them effectively.

Cultural diversity

25. We also welcome the work of UNESCO on cultural diversity, multilingualism and eradication of illiteracy. These issues will be examined during the forthcoming meeting of the Group of 77 Chapters to take place in Paris.

North-South dialogue

26. We stress the importance of a G-7/G-8 dialogue on strengthening international economic cooperation for development through partnership as an essential mechanism for the discussion of emerging and urgent issues relevant to the strengthening of a global partnership for development to further strengthen the efforts of the international community in addressing development issues of international concern, including the implementation of the agreed commitments and outcomes of major United Nations conferences and summits. In this context, we call on the forthcoming annual meeting of the G-8, to be held in Canada in July 2002, to take into account the interests and concerns of developing countries. The Chairman of the Group of 77 in New York, as mandated by the Havana Programme of Action, will convey those interests and concerns to that meeting.

South-South cooperation

27. We reiterate our commitment to implementing the outcome of the South Summit, held in Havana from 10 to 14 April 2000. We welcome the status of the implementation process of the South Summit outcome submitted by the Chairman of

the Group of 77 in New York and we express our appreciation to the Office of the Chairman of the Group of 77 for its valuable and continued support for this process.

28. We also reiterate our strong commitment to speed up the implementation process in the sphere of competence of each chapter and we call upon G-77 member States to contribute generously to the special fund established in accordance with the provisions of the Havana Programme of Action.

29. We reaffirm our commitment to further strengthening South-South cooperation and we welcome the outcome of the Tehran Meeting (IFCC-X) and consider that both the Tehran Consensus and the recommendations adopted by the Committee constitute a roadmap for the revitalization of economic and technical cooperation among developing countries and invite our chapters and relevant organizations therein to fully implement those recommendations. In this context, we welcome the generous offer by the Government of Venezuela to host the Group of 77 High-level Conference on South-South Cooperation, to be held in Caracas in December 2002, in accordance with the South Summit mandate.

30. We stress the crucial importance of the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP) as an instrument for promoting South-South cooperation and trade in this context. We recall the decision of the Havana Summit to consider further deepening and expansion of the GSTP in order to enhance its effectiveness, as well as to review the implementation and the performance and impact of the GSTP among developing countries with a view to deepening and expanding the GSTP and invite the Chairman of the Group of 77, in coordination with the Geneva Chapter, to convene an intergovernmental consultative meeting as soon as possible and to request UNCTAD to contribute to this process. In this context, we urge the GSTP participants to continue their financial support to the GSTP through voluntary contributions and we further call on the UNCTAD secretariat to continue its support of the operations of the GSTP Agreement.

31. We note with satisfaction the progress made so far by the Perez-Guerrero Trust Fund for Economic and Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries in support of South-South cooperation projects and call upon all members of the Group of 77 as well as the United Nations system to support the expansion of the Trust Fund.

32. We welcome the report of the Geneva Advisory Team on the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the Group of 77 and enhancing coordination among the Group of 77 Chapters, which will be reviewed at the chapters' meeting in Paris with a view to making it operational.

33. We have agreed to hold our thirty-third coordinating meeting in Paris, at UNESCO headquarters.



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Agenda item 62
Question of Cyprus**

**Security Council
Fifty-seventh year**

**Letter dated 12 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative of
Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 12 March 2002, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ümit Pamir
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 12 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 21 January 2002 (A/56/785-S/2002/100) from the Greek Cypriot representative to the United Nations addressed to you, which contains allegations of "violations of the airspace of the Republic" and "of the flight information region of Nicosia".

It will be recalled that similar allegations of so-called "airspace and flight information region violations" were refuted in our previous communications addressed to you, most recently in my letter dated 2 November 2001 (A/56/525-S/2001/1044). I wish to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the appropriate authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in southern Cyprus has no jurisdiction or any right of say whatsoever. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that allegations of so-called violations of the flight information region or violations of air-traffic regulations are void and groundless under international law. Every precaution is being taken for the safety of navigation of civil air traffic during the activities of Turkish State aircraft within international airspace, within which the civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the only competent authority to provide air-traffic and aeronautical information services.

As stated in my previous letters, such allegations are based on the false and illegitimate claim that the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot administration extends over the whole island, including the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This claim by the Greek Cypriot side is divorced from the existing realities in Cyprus, namely, the existence of two independent States, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within their respective territories on the island.

It is important to note that at a time when direct talks are under way between the two States in Cyprus, on the basis of the agreement drafted by President Denktas and Mr. Clerides on 4 December 2001, the Greek Cypriot administration is continuing, within the framework of the Greek-Greek Cypriot Joint Military Doctrine, its military build-up and activities in southern Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot daily newspaper, *Alithia*, dated 21 February 2002, reported that the Greek Cypriot Defence Minister, Mr. Hasikos, had made it clear that the Greek Cypriot side "would continue to arm irrespective of the process of direct talks between the two sides".

Recent rearmament activities of the Greek Cypriot administration have been widely reported in the Greek Cypriot press. Significantly, as disclosed by the Greek Cypriot daily *Simerini*, dated 28 January 2002, the Greek Cypriot administration has acquired Russian Mil Mi-35-type assault helicopters. According to the Greek Cypriot press, dated 30 January 2002, the Greek Cypriot Defence Minister revealed to the press that the assault helicopters had been deployed in the island around eight months earlier and that this was kept a secret at that time. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot daily *Fileleftheros*, dated 17 February 2002, carried a report in its "Defence and Strategy" section about the BM-21 Grad-type multiple rocket launchers acquired recently by the Greek Cypriot side and reported that "these powerful

weapons will be used in a counter-attack against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus".

In addition to the foregoing, the Greek Cypriot daily *Fileleftheros* of 15 January 2002 reported that the Greek Cypriot Defence Minister had confirmed press reports that the Greek Cypriot administration would be buying unmanned spy planes and armoured transport helicopters. The Greek Cypriot dailies, *Politis*, dated 21 November 2001, and *Mahi*, dated 2 December 2001, both reported that the Greek Cypriot administration would acquire assault speed boats and upgrade its air and ground combat capabilities through the modernization of its anti-tank weapons with GTT-106 artillery units and state-of-the-art ballistic computer systems. Reportedly, Othellos-type anti-aircraft systems would be upgraded with Aspide missiles and Russian T-80 tanks, VAB-type vehicles (which have already been equipped with HOK missiles) and BMP-3-type armoured vehicles would be further equipped with thermal cameras. The Greek Cypriot daily, *Cyprus Mail*, dated 1 December 2001, reported that the Greek Cypriot administration also included in this year's defence budget the necessary funds for the purchase of advanced coastal radar systems as well as additional combat helicopters. It was also reported by the Greek Cypriot press on 24 February 2002 that Greece would be donating two French-made destroyers to the Greek Cypriot administration.

As part of its provocative military activities, the Greek Cypriot administration carried out, in early February, the "Olympos 2002" planned military command exercise, which was conducted simultaneously with the "Alexandros 2002" military exercise by Greece. Both exercises were carried out within the framework of the Joint Military Doctrine and have included, once again, provocative scenarios such as "liberating the North".

The Greek Cypriot administration, which ostensibly supports the demilitarization of the island and calls for the withdrawal of all "foreign troops", is not only acquiring offensive weapons but is also expanding its army by enabling even more Greek nationals to join the Greek Cypriot National Guard. The Greek Cypriot daily *Fileleftheros*, dated 11 December 2001, reported that the Greek Cypriot administration was currently recruiting more professional soldiers from southern Cyprus as well as from Greece in accordance with the Joint Military Doctrine. The same newspaper, dated 24 November 2001, also refers to an announcement by the Greek Cypriot Defence Minister that legislation enabling women to do voluntary military service had been prepared and would be presented to the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives.

My Government believes that, at this crucial stage, all sides should refrain from taking any action which would hamper the prospects of achieving progress through the current phase of direct talks. We hope that the Greek Cypriot administration will abandon its adventurous stance. We hope that it will adopt a constructive approach which will enable us to make progress towards a comprehensive settlement between the two States. We believe that it is the duty of the international community to urge the Greek Cypriot administration to cease all hostile and provocative activities and concentrate its efforts on reaching a peaceful settlement.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ **Plümer**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus





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
**Security Council
Fifty-seventh year**

**Letter dated 13 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative of
Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 12 March 2002, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Umit Pamir
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 13 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to convey herewith a copy of a letter dated 6 March 2002 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, concerning the unilateral change of the provisions for search and rescue (SAR) services within the Nicosia flight information region in disregard of the International Civil Aviation Organization rules and provisions of the 1960 treaties on Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its appendix were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ Plümer
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Appendix

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

President's Office

6 March 2002

I have the honour to bring to your kind attention the views of the Turkish Cypriot side concerning the unilateral change of the provisions for search and rescue (SAR) services within the Nicosia flight information region (FIR).

Greek Cypriot side issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) number A0070/02 dated 7 February 2002 which stated that as from 1 March 2002, SAR services within the Nicosia FIR would be provided by the Larnaca Rescue Coordination Centre instead of the Episkopi Rescue Coordination Centre. This act of unilateral change not only totally ignores the established rules and procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), but also pays no attention to the provisions of the 1960 treaties.

It should be noted that the provision of SAR services (within the context of Article 25 of the Chicago Convention and annex 12 to the same Convention) were taken over by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the early 1950s during the establishment of the Nicosia FIR in accordance with ICAO rules and procedures, with regional agreement and approval of the ICAO Council. This has been recorded in the European Air Navigational Plan (EUR ANP) accordingly.

The 1960 treaties concerning Cyprus did not change this; they even enhanced it with an explicit provision. Any modification to these arrangements could only be possible with the consent of the parties to said treaties.

As far as ICAO rules and procedures are concerned, any change to the regional plan requires regional consultation and agreement.

The unilateral change of authority on provision of SAR regarding Cyprus is, therefore, against the ICAO rules and provisions of the 1960 treaties. Our objection on this matter has already been announced by our authorities through NOTAM No. 0009/02 dated 28 February 2002.

It is obvious that the mistake, which has been the main obstacle in the way of the 39-year-long efforts at reconciliation, has been repeated and the realities of the island ignored when it was decided to make this unilateral change of SAR services. I deem it, therefore, useful to once again underline the political and legal facts of the island.

The "Government of Cyprus" which issued the said NOTAM and is supposed to be responsible for SAR services within the Nicosia FIR, is an administration solely composed of Greek Cypriots, representing only the Greek Cypriot people and has no right or competence to extend those services to the territory, air space or territorial waters of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The partnership Republic established in 1960 was destroyed through the force of arms by the Greek Cypriots in 1963. Since then, there has not been a government competent to represent the whole of the island. The Turkish Cypriot people have since been ruling

themselves and have been represented by their own State, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

The Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, being the legitimate authority representing the Turkish Cypriot people and having exclusive authority on its own territory, has provided air traffic services (ATS), aeronautical information services (AIS) and alerting services (AS) within its territory and in the airspace above it as well as within the limits of Ercan Advisory Airspace (EAA) since 1977. The Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus also has sufficient means for provision of SAR services within its territory and within the limits of EAA, as well as means of communication and coordination with adjacent SAR and ATS units of the Republic of Turkey.

It is evident that this unilateral handing over of SAR services, which not only contradicts the principle of political equality of the two sides, but is also contrary to the provisions of 1960 treaties and the political, legal and practical realities prevailing in Cyprus, will give wrong signals to the Greek Cypriot side and will not contribute positively to the ongoing efforts exerted towards establishing a new partnership on the basis of equality and to the new process which began on 4 December 2001.

(Signed) Rauf R. **Denktaş**
President

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**The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for
international peace and security****Report of the Secretary-General****I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1383 (2001) of 6 December 2001, paragraph 13 of General Assembly resolution 56/220 A of 21 December 2001 and as a follow-up to my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 5 December 2001 (S/2001/1154).

2. The United Nations has long been engaged in Afghanistan. In recent years we have been trying on the one hand to bring an end to the inter-Afghan fighting that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, and on the other hand delivering much-needed humanitarian assistance to a large number of Afghan men, women and children, both inside Afghanistan and in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, especially Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

3. At the time the Bonn Conference was convened in November 2001, United Nations political and mediation activities were carried out by the United Nations Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSM). United Nations humanitarian and development activities, conducted by its agencies, funds and programmes were coordinated by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan. For security reasons, all international United Nations personnel were withdrawn from Afghanistan in September 2001. From September to

November, they managed emergency activities from Islamabad, where many of them had maintained a base of operations for Afghanistan for a number of years.

4. On 5 December, the Bonn Conference concluded successfully. Under cover of my letter dated the same day, the members of the Security Council received the text of the "Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions" (Bonn Agreement), which had been signed in Bonn on that date (S/2001/1154).

5. In its resolution 1383 (2001), adopted the following day, the Security Council endorsed the Bonn Agreement; called for full commitment by all Afghan groups to the Agreement's implementation; and declared its willingness to take further action, on the basis of a report of the Secretary-General, to support the interim institutions established in the Agreement, as well as the implementation of the Agreement and its annexes.

6. The present report summarizes the key developments in Afghanistan since the signing of the Bonn Agreement. It also proposes a structure for the United Nations presence in Afghanistan in accordance with its responsibilities under the Bonn Agreement, taking into account current political, security and humanitarian conditions in the country.



II. Status of implementation of the Bonn Agreement: establishment of the Interim Administration and key commissions

A. Context

7. The Bonn Agreement represents a historic opportunity for the people of Afghanistan to emerge from a cycle of conflict and devastating poverty into a future in which there can be reconstruction and peaceful development. The Agreement was reached under extraordinary circumstances. Inevitably, the exigencies of the process resulted in a less than fully representative selection of delegates for the talks and for selection of the members of the Interim Administration.

8. The implementation period of the Bonn Agreement is envisaged to last for two to three years, and is intended to lead to a full-fledged government, chosen freely by the entire electorate of Afghanistan. The Interim Authority chosen at Bonn is to be succeeded by a Transitional Authority, selected through an emergency *loya jirga* that is to convene within six months of the establishment of the Interim Authority. The participants in the *loya jirga* are to be drawn from all segments of society, and the representation of women and all ethnic and religious communities is to be ensured. The Transitional Authority is to lead Afghanistan until a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair elections, which are to be held no later than two years after the date of the convening of the emergency *loya jirga*. A constitutional *loya jirga* to ratify a new constitution is to convene within 18 months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority.

9. Major difficulties had to be overcome during the Bonn Conference, with the various parties questioning the degree to which the other adequately represented the entire population of Afghanistan. These mutual suspicions and accusations did not fully disappear with the establishment of the Interim Administration. They are explained by the fact that the members of the Interim Administration were not a cohesive group at the time of their inauguration, nor, for all intents and purposes, are they today. This lack of cohesion continues to exacerbate tensions when incidents occur, such as the assassination on 14 February of Abdul

Rahman, the Minister of Civil Aviation and Tourism. The situation is further compounded by the unsettled political conditions that still prevail in the south and east of the country. The international coalition's continuing military campaign against terrorism is occurring in parallel with great tension, and sometimes fighting, between Pashtun political and tribal leaders who are competing for predominance in their respective communities. In addition, vehement protests persist that Pashtuns are grossly underrepresented in all official institutions, especially in the security sector.

10. Notwithstanding the original criticisms concerning the ethnic and political imbalance perceived in the Interim Administration from the outset and the persistence of uneasiness within and around it, the reaction to the signing of the Bonn Agreement was largely positive in Afghanistan, for two main reasons. First, the majority of the population — exhausted, impoverished and desperately yearning for peace — recognized that a unique opportunity presented itself for the country finally to start down the path to peace and sustainable development, after more than 23 years of war. It was an opportunity that might not present itself again, and therefore could not be squandered. Second, many noted that the Bonn Agreement allowed for progressively more representative forms of government through a three-stage process. This process is now well and truly under way.

B. Establishment of the Interim Administration

11. Against this backdrop of both criticism and hope, the Interim Authority was established on 22 December 2001, as prescribed by the Bonn Agreement. Hamid Karzai was sworn in as Chairman of the Interim Administration, as were the Vice-Chairpersons and all other heads of departments in the Interim Administration. The ceremony was held in an atmosphere of national unity. Leaders of the existing factions and representatives from all 32 provinces in the country participated in the event, together with a large number of foreign guests, including, in particular, representatives of all of Afghanistan's neighbours, the European Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the United Nations. Outgoing President Burhannudin Rabbani stated at the inaugural ceremony that such a peaceful transfer of power had "no precedence in our troubled society for centuries".

12. The day after he was sworn in as Chairman of the Interim Administration, on 23 December, Mr. Karzai convened its first cabinet meeting. He met thereafter with Lakhdar Brahimi, my Special Representative for Afghanistan, and sought United Nations assistance in a broad range of areas in order to facilitate the work of the Interim Administration. At its inception, the Interim Administration had no funds of its own, yet it faced the daunting task of finding buildings to house a number of newly established departments, including the newly created Ministry of Women's Affairs, and procuring basic office furniture and equipment to enable departmental staff to begin working. In addition, the Interim Administration had no means of paying the salaries of its new members, let alone of the civil servants at all levels who had not been paid for five to six months. Despite these formidable hurdles, the Interim Administration has managed to make progress in a number of areas, concretely as well as symbolically, domestically as well as internationally.
13. During its first two weeks, the members of the Cabinet conducted a consultative process to establish an initial policy framework and a consensus on its immediate priorities. This resulted in a vision for Afghanistan's development that Mr. Karzai presented in a speech to the international community at the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo in January 2002.
14. Subsequently, the Interim Administration started work to prepare an interim budget. Rules for the formation of a budget and the payment of salaries have been reviewed and found to be largely satisfactory. The payment system has been revived and the salaries of central government staff have been paid in the capital for two months in a row. The process is now being extended to the provinces, and a full documentation of the staff and functions of government departments at the provincial level is being prepared.
15. The Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority has been created, and agreements in a number of sectors on both short-term priorities and long-term interventions have been reached with bilateral and multilateral parties. The Interim Administration has started to work on a national development framework in partnership with other development actors. Ministries and the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority are working collaboratively with United Nations agencies, donors and non-governmental organizations to put in place a series of national programmes that reflect the Interim Administration's priorities and that are oriented towards building the capacity of the Afghan Government, civil society and private sector over time.
16. The Interim Administration has made a strong commitment to accountability and transparency. The first technical assistance project has been signed with the World Bank to provide for procurement, accounting and financial management functions to be handled by international firms from April 2002 onwards.
17. A back-to-school campaign is under way to ensure widespread student enrolment when the new school year begins on 23 March. Plans drawn by relevant ministers are being implemented with the active cooperation of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and non-governmental organizations. In the agricultural sector, an agreement was reached with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the United States Agency for International Development to distribute seeds and fertilizers in time for the spring planting. A dialogue between relevant ministers and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is under way to develop a programmatic approach to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. An Interim Administration/United Nations planning task force has been established to address the nutrition crisis. Preparations are under way to ensure that the focus of development activities is extended from Kabul to the provinces as quickly as possible. All of this, of course, will require sustained international financial support. It is earnestly hoped that the flow of resources from donors will increase significantly in April to allow these crucial programmes to be implemented.
18. The Interim Administration has passed four major decrees since its inauguration on 22 December. The first of these cancelled all decrees and legal documents passed by previous authorities. The second banned the cultivation, production, processing, use and trafficking of illicit drugs (and the Interim Administration is looking to the support of the international community for help in implementing this decree). The third decree set out a framework for the press and radio and television broadcasting, including principles for freedom of the press and procedures for licensing of the press by the Minister of Information and Culture. The fourth decree established procedures for signing

contracts or agreements with the international private sector and donor and development agencies, according to which all agreements must be ratified by the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority.

19. Perhaps as important as the specific decisions and actions taken by the Interim Administration is the way in which people from every part of Afghanistan have rallied around Chairman Karzai as a symbol of the return of peace and stability to the country. This was evident from the huge popular receptions that Mr. Karzai received during his visits to Herat and Jalalabad. Likewise, Afghans throughout the country continue to look to Kabul as the symbol of national unity, irrespective of their very strong regional affiliations. It is therefore an encouraging sign that the Interim Administration has started to invite regional leaders to Kabul to discuss issues of national importance. During the first two weeks of March, separate national conferences were held with education officials, all military commanders and all provincial governors. I hope that the dialogue between Kabul and the provinces will increase over time.

20. On a related issue, the Ministry of Women's Affairs organized a major national event in Kabul to commemorate International Women's Day on 8 March. This event, attended by Afghan women and men from around the country as well as foreign dignitaries, including Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Noeleen Heyzer, Executive Director of the United Nations Development Fund for Women and the Minister for Women's Affairs of Pakistan, marked an important step towards restoring to the women and girls of Afghanistan those fundamental rights that have been denied them over the past several decades.

21. At the international level, a significant development has been the diplomacy of Chairman Karzai and his administration. Mr. Karzai has travelled extensively, building the profile of the Interim Administration and championing the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In visits to neighbouring countries, whose support and non-interference are critical for the success of the Bonn process, the Interim Administration is trying to mend fences and forge good relations. Mr. Karzai himself has been an effective advocate for Afghanistan's dire needs. He has also been an ambassador of Afghanistan's aspirations, which are built on international responsibility and cooperation and participation in the international economy.

Mr. Karzai has emphasized that, while in the short term Afghanistan is forced to rely on humanitarian and developmental assistance, in the longer term trade will be the driver of growth and the creator of opportunity. Many of Mr. Karzai's discussions with international leaders have focused on trade relationships. The United States of America has promised Afghanistan most-favoured-nation status. Discussions on trade relationships are also under way with the European Union. An Overseas Private Investment Corporation guarantee has been granted to provide incentives for private sector investors in Afghanistan.

22. Also on the international front, a significant development has been the participation of the Interim Administration, represented by Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, at the meeting of the "six-plus-two" group held in Kabul on 11 March. The inclusion of Afghanistan in these discussions opens a new and hopeful chapter in the dialogue to restore regional peace and stability, which has been undermined by inter-Afghan wars and foreign interference for the past two decades.

C. United Nations support to the Interim Administration and the civil service

23. The speed with which the Interim Administration has established its international and domestic legitimacy has been extremely impressive, especially given the meagre material resources at its disposal. Recognizing that the Interim Administration would need immediate cash in hand upon its establishment, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established, at the request of my Special Representative, the Afghanistan Interim Authority Fund immediately after the conclusion of the Bonn Agreement.

24. Donors were initially asked to contribute \$20 million to the Fund to meet the most basic and immediate needs of the Interim Administration, especially salaries for the civil service. A larger figure was not sought at the outset in order to ensure that discussions could take place with the Interim Administration on immediate priorities and so that basic measures of accountability and transparency could be put in place, after which additional funds would be sought from donor countries.

25. Contributions to the Fund were slow to arrive and, despite pledges of \$16 million, only \$8.6 million had been committed and \$1 million actually paid by 31 December. Nevertheless, UNDP was able to provide complete office kits, including desks, chairs, computers, facsimile machines, telephones and vehicles to the Chairman and each of the 29 ministers.

26. Within a week of its creation, the Interim Administration established a Working Group, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Finance and assisted by the United Nations, to come up with a very detailed list of government employees in Kabul and the provinces, as well as a mechanism for the payment of salaries. Within a matter of days, the Group had assessed the size of the entire Afghan civil service. It was initially estimated to consist of 240,000 employees at most, including staff of local administrations, workers in State-owned enterprises, ministry staff, teachers, health workers and police, but excluding the armed forces. This is considered to be an appropriate numerical ratio of civil servants to the population. The civil service's technical capacity and quality, however, needs to be enhanced significantly.

27. The Working Group suggested that the average amount of financial support required per employee was approximately \$28 per month, supplemented by a food ration provided by the World Food Programme (WFP) until October 2002, which amounted to the equivalent of \$12 per month per employee. This rather low figure was suggested bearing in mind that the funds would have to be raised from external resources.

28. Based on this wage structure, and assuming that the size of the civil service was probably less than 240,000, it was determined that approximately \$50 million would be required to cover the salaries and related expenses of the Interim Administration for the period from January to June 2002. Moreover, the Working Group recommended paying civil servants back pay for the previous five months, which would cost approximately \$40 million.

29. As at 8 March, \$32.3 million had been pledged to the Afghanistan Interim Authority Fund and \$26.8 million had been received. The European Commission has recently pledged to contribute another 20 million euros to replenish the Fund, and to provide the full amount requested for the period from January to June 2002, if salaries are paid in United States dollars.

30. So far 77,000 civil servants' salaries have been paid from the Fund. It was a real tour de force to enable the Interim Administration to start paying salaries for its first month in existence. My gratitude goes to the donor countries that contributed the funds, to UNDP officials who worked in Kabul and New York to physically transport the money to Kabul on time and to the Afghan officials who worked around the clock to manually prepare, in cooperation with United Nations personnel, the lists of civil servants to be paid.

31. At the same time, civil service salaries in most of the provinces have not been paid, as the Interim Administration has not yet been able to obtain payroll information for the provincial employees. With regard to the level and roster of provincial employees, Ministry of Finance and UNDP staff are now visiting key cities in the provinces to obtain the information necessary to begin meeting the provincial payroll. In addition, payroll expenditures for teachers will increase in March with the opening of the school year. While \$10 million in cash has been pre-positioned in Islamabad to pay salaries for the months of February and March, the disbursement has been delayed, pending a decision from the Interim Administration on the currency to be used (i.e., United States dollars or afghanis).

D. Civil Service Commission

32. Even more challenging than determining the size of the civil service and mechanisms for the payment of salaries is the articulation of and adherence to criteria for civil service recruitment. The Bonn Agreement provides for the establishment of a Civil Service Commission to address these criteria, with the assistance of the United Nations, although it does not prescribe its composition or set a deadline by which it must be convened.

33. In the meantime, the Interim Administration has issued 88 commands appointing people to high-ranking military and civilian posts (governors and deputy ministers) and 740 orders assigning people to lower-ranking posts in the military and civilian departments. Many of these appointments have given rise to increasing criticism, with, in particular, allegations that they are too often based on family or ethnic ties, factionalism and patronage. Such concerns underscore the urgent need to establish a Civil Service Commission. A small group of dedicated officials

nominated by Chairman Karzai has worked with the Office of the Special Representative and has completed the preparatory work for the establishment of the Civil Service Commission. This work is based on a 1970 law that established a similar body. It is expected that the Interim Administration will soon enact a decree that will allow the Commission to begin functioning.

E. Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga

34. The United Nations has been given a key role to play with regard to the emergency *loya jirga*. Specifically, it has been requested to assist in the establishment and functioning of the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency *Loya Jirga*; to advise the Interim Authority on establishing a politically neutral environment conducive to the holding of the emergency *loya jirga* in free and fair conditions; to attend, if invited, the meetings of the Special Independent Commission; and to facilitate the resolution of any impasses arising from matters related to the convening of the emergency *loya jirga*.

35. The Bonn Agreement called for the Special Independent Commission for the Emergency *Loya Jirga* to be established within one month of the formation of the Interim Authority. I was particularly gratified, therefore, to have been present in Kabul on 25 January, when Chairman Karzai was able to announce its formation on schedule. The Commission was officially inaugurated on 7 February in the presence of the Chairman and members of the Interim Administration, other Afghan dignitaries, the diplomatic corps and the national and international media. Chairman Karzai made it clear in his speech on that occasion that the Interim Administration respected fully and would safeguard the independent status of the Commission. He encouraged the Commission to work in all regions of the country. Their work over the coming months, supported by the United Nations, will be critical to the creation of a *loya jirga* that represents the popular wishes of all Afghans.

36. The members of the Commission were selected following an extensive process of consultation with a wide range of intellectuals, civil society groups, religious and political leaders and members of the

Interim Administration. The 21 commissioners were chosen from a cross-section of ethnic and religious groups, based on their technical qualifications, reputation and standing in the community, from more than 300 names proposed; 3 of the 21 commissioners, including a Vice-Chairperson, are women.

37. To further ensure the independence of the Commission, it has been decided that it will be funded through the Afghanistan Interim Authority Fund. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has generously provided the initial funds required, in the amount of 500,000 pounds, to enable the Commission to commence its activities. Discussions are now ongoing with potential donors to fund additional logistical requirements of the Commission, as well as for the organization of the emergency *loya jirga* itself.

38. The Commission has been making progress towards formulating the rules and procedures for the convening and the conduct of the *loya jirga*. They are expected to be announced on 21 March, the Afghan New Year. The commissioners, accompanied by United Nations staff, have begun to undertake visits to Afghanistan's provinces with a view to increasing awareness of the Commission's role and to solicit advice from the people about how to make the emergency *loya jirga* as representative and fair as possible. Very successful public meetings have been held in the Ghor, Bamyan, Paktia, Nangarhar and Laghman provinces, where Afghans have demonstrated overwhelming support for the emergency *loya jirga*, including the participation of women.

39. At the same time, Afghans have expressed the fear that armed groups could influence the selection or election — the Bonn Agreement provides for both — of delegates to the *loya jirga*. The Commission has so far been able to operate without interference from outside parties, but it is feared that the political pressure on the commissioners will increase substantially as the date for the formation of the emergency *loya jirga* draws closer. Already there have been reports of money being distributed and widespread lobbying by political groups and powerful figures who are trying to get large numbers of their supporters into the emergency *loya jirga*.

40. The emergency *loya jirga* is a crucial milestone in the Bonn process. I strongly appeal to all Afghan parties to do everything possible to enhance the

credibility and legitimacy of what will be a momentous event in the recent history of Afghanistan. I also strongly appeal to Member States and the international community as a whole to maintain their political commitment and to redouble their efforts to support the peace process during the coming critical months.

F. Human Rights and Judicial Commissions

41. In addition to the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency *Loya Jirga* and the Civil Service Commission, the Bonn Agreement calls for the United Nations to assist in the establishment of an independent Human Rights Commission and a Judicial Commission. There is a growing sense of urgency to establish these two Commissions now that the *loya jirga* process is well under way.

42. In a cooperative initiative between representatives of Afghan civil society, officials of the Interim Administration and the United Nations, a national workshop on human rights was convened in Kabul on 9 March. The participants represented a wide spectrum of Afghan society, including men and women, a range of ethnic groups and representatives from various regions of the country. They included human rights specialists and activists drawn from national non-governmental organizations, academia, the Special Independent Commission and relevant ministries of the Interim Administration. The meeting was opened by Chairman Karzai and was chaired by Sima Samar, Vice-Chairperson of the Interim Administration and Minister for Women's Affairs. The keynote address was delivered by Mrs. Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The workshop produced four standing working groups, composed entirely of Afghans, which will formulate proposals for: (a) the establishment of the independent Human Rights Commission; (b) the development of the national programme of human rights education; (c) approaches to human rights monitoring, investigation and remedial action; and (d) the advancement of the rights of women. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of the Special Representative are currently supporting these groups in the follow-up to the workshop, which marks an important first step in the implementation of the human rights provisions of the Bonn Agreement.

43. Once the Human Rights Commission is established and functioning, the United Nations will be in a better position to further develop its plans for fulfilling the human rights-related responsibilities entrusted to it in the Bonn Agreement. In this regard, the United Nations approach will be guided by Afghan human rights organizations and activists, who are best placed to advise on how international human rights law and standards can be implemented in Afghanistan's particular social, political and cultural context. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has seconded a human rights adviser to the Office of the Special Representative in Kabul to provide advice to him in these initial stages of development of a human rights programme. The activities of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Kamal Hossain, will also continue to constitute an important component of United Nations human rights engagement with Afghanistan.

44. As with the Human Rights Commission, the work of the Judicial Commission will touch on issues central to the values and traditions of different segments of Afghan society. It is imperative, therefore, that the Afghan men and women chosen to serve on the Commission be highly respected, apolitical and suitably qualified to discharge their duties. The Interim Administration will cooperate closely with lawyers and judges, other interested parties and individuals and the United Nations to identify potential candidates for the Commission, with a view to establishing it as soon as possible.

III. Security

A. General situation

45. Juxtaposed against the remarkable progress made in the formation of the Interim Administration and the Special Independent Commission for the Emergency *Loya Jirga* is the unstable security situation, which remains very worrying in certain parts of the country. Unlike in Kabul — where the efforts of the Interior Ministry and the presence of the International Security Assistance Force, led by the United Kingdom, have pushed the crime rate down and improved stability — the situation across the rest of the country, especially outside the main towns, has remained volatile and unpredictable.

46. In general, insecurity remains the prime cause of concern for Afghans across the country for three reasons in particular. First, although al-Qa'idah and Taliban forces have been routed, pockets of resistance remain. Second, factional clashes are taking place between rival Afghan political and military actors seeking regional influence, which has led to both inter- and intra-ethnic violence. Third, banditry continues as a lingering manifestation of the war economy that has developed over the past two decades in the absence of proper security and a system of enforceable law.

47. As concerns the terrorist threat, serious fighting suddenly flared up in the south-eastern region, between the coalition forces and a large, well-equipped and determined group of al-Qa'idah and Taliban fighters in the beginning of March. The severity of that encounter alone serves as a sober reminder of what coalition leaders, as well as the United Nations, have been repeating regularly: the struggle against terrorism and those who support it in Afghanistan is not over and, furthermore, it is closely linked to the success of the peace process. The peace process remains under threat by terrorist groups and those who support them, and there is no room for complacency.

48. While the vast majority of Afghans are united in their desire to eradicate terrorism from Afghanistan's soil, the collapse of the Taliban regime has precipitated struggles for power both within the Interim Administration and in the regions. In the south, factional fighting tends to be intra-ethnic, while in the north, clashes have been reported between ethnic groups, in particular between Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara factions.

49. Rivalries continue to flare up across the Pashtun areas as different groups forge alliances and vie with each other for power. Several parts of the southern provinces of Helmand and Nimruz remain off limits. At the end of February, there were reports of clashes between forces of the Pashtun Noorzai and Ismael Khan, the governor of Herat province.

50. In the north, fighting in late January and early February between Jamiat (Tajik) and Jumbesh (Uzbek) forces left about 20 dead and injured. A team from the Interim Administration and the United Nations travelled to Mazar-e-Sharif, and after mediation the parties promised to abide by an agreement to demilitarize the city and to establish a security commission. The rivalry between local commanders

remains intense, however, and the situation in the city is uneasy. An initial group of a 600-person-strong multi-ethnic police force, with representation from all the political parties, was created, and armed units were withdrawn to barracks. Nonetheless, a few weeks after the troops withdrew, fighting erupted between two garrison commanders, resulting in two dead and several wounded, and serving as a reminder that the situation remains unpredictable.

51. In Gardez, the Interim Administration's appointment of Badshah Khan Zadran as provincial governor met with fierce local resistance in early February. Badshah Khan tried to take Gardez and the governor's seat militarily, but was beaten back by forces loyal to the local shura. Fifty people, mainly civilians, died in the fighting. The threat of renewed conflict remains, though the situation has so far been stabilized following Chairman Karzai's appointment of a new governor, who is from outside the area.

52. While many of the incidents cited above are rooted in political struggles for power, there have also been reports of ethnically motivated attacks and serious violations of human rights. I am very concerned, in particular, about reports in the north of the harassment of Pashtuns by other ethnic groups, which has led to a flow of refugees towards Pakistan. United Nations personnel, as well as non-governmental organizations and human rights organizations, have visited dozens of villages in the north and have documented numerous incidents of violence and looting over the past three months. Chairman Karzai appointed a three-person special independent commission to investigate the situation of ethnic minorities there, which has just submitted its report. Also, during her visit to Afghanistan in early March, the High Commissioner for Human Rights visited the north, interviewed victims and spoke to commanders and local officials. Local authorities in the north have promised to act rapidly to put an end to the abuses.

53. All of the above strongly argues for urgent action, especially: (a) an active effort on the part of Afghan leaders to bring their more reluctant peers into the political process and to become personally involved in ensuring the investigation of allegations of human rights violations; (b) a rapid effort to train and equip an Afghan security force that is effective and loyal to the Interim Authority; and, (c) an international effort to help bridge the security gap between current

arrangements and the eventual deployment of an effective Afghan security force.

54. The need for speed on this front is highlighted by the fact that even isolated incidents can have a tremendously negative psychological impact on elements of the population that remain sceptical about the prospects of the Bonn process. This was particularly true after the murder of Dr. Rahman, the Minister for Civil Aviation and Tourism, at Kabul Airport on 14 February. Mr. Karzai has established a ministerial commission to investigate the murder, whose circumstances remain unclear and subject to competing theories. Zalmai Rassoul, an aide to the former King, Zahir Shah, was appointed to replace the late Dr. Rahman.

B. International Security Assistance Force

55. In annex I to the Bonn Agreement, the parties to the Agreement called for the deployment of an international security force to assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urban centres and other areas. Pursuant to that request, the Security Council adopted resolution 1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001 authorizing the establishment for six months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations, can operate in a secure environment.

56. The United Kingdom agreed to lead this force for the first three months, and 17 other Member States agreed to participate in it. Deployment began in early January, following the conclusion of a military-technical agreement between the United Kingdom and the Interim Administration on 4 January. Initial operating capability (one fully functioning battalion and support units) was reached in mid-January. The International Security Assistance Force declared the achievement of full operational capacity on 18 February and now has over 4,800 troops conducting 30 patrols a day around the clock; about 50 per cent of the patrols are conducted jointly with the local police. The Force Commander, Major-General John McColl, has indicated that patrolling would be increased in order to tackle the "lawless elements" of Kabul. The return of Afghan military units to barracks has progressed

smoothly, and there are only small groups remaining outside designated army quarters. The Ministry of Defence said it has told these soldiers to move to barracks very soon.

57. The residents of Kabul have uniformly welcomed the presence of the International Security Assistance Force. In addition, most Afghans, including powerful regional figures such as General Rashid Dostum and Abdul Karim Khalili, have requested that the Force be deployed beyond Kabul (i.e., beyond the limits set in the military-technical agreement and resolution 1386 (2001), but as envisaged in the Bonn Agreement), where an ongoing lack of security presents a serious threat to the Bonn process by leaving open the possibility of a return to the dynamics of 1992.

58. In his presentation to the Security Council on 30 January, Mr. Karzai stated that the extension of the presence of multinational forces in Kabul to other major cities would signal the ongoing commitment of the international community to peace and security in Afghanistan. He asked the Council to authorize those measures.

59. At present, the Force remains limited to Kabul, while the main threats to the Interim Administration emanate from the provinces. There is a continuing danger that existing security structures, both Afghan and international, will not adequately address the security threats that are currently discernible and that are likely to increase as the convening of the emergency *loya jirga* approaches. I hope that the Security Council will consider these factors and support the wish of the Afghan people for the expansion of the Force.

C. Creation of and provision of support to the national security sector

60. As stated in the Bonn Agreement, the responsibility for ensuring security throughout Afghanistan ultimately rests with the Afghans themselves. To this end, international security forces are a temporary measure to provide the confidence, time and breathing room required for the creation of an indigenous security sector (a national army, police force, judicial system and corrections system). It is therefore urgent that such a security sector be established as quickly as possible, constituted in accordance with and guided by international

humanitarian and human rights law. A Joint Coordination Body was established on 13 January to ensure close cooperation between the Interim Administration, the International Security Assistance Force and the United Nations on matters related to the security sector. The Joint Coordination Body has now met five times, on a fortnightly basis, and includes the heads of the Departments of Defence and Interior, General Muhammad Qassem Fahim and Mohammed Yunus Qanooni respectively, as well as the Commander of the Force, Major General McColl, and my Special Representative.

The national army

61. The task of creating a national army that is truly multi-ethnic and apolitical requires the following, at a minimum:

- (a) Political agreement on its primary purposes;
- (b) Political agreement on its overall size and command structure;
- (c) International assistance for its design, training and equipment;
- (d) International assistance to sustain operating costs in the initial period, including payment of salaries and benefits;
- (e) Creation of incentives for reducing existing force levels.

62. These issues are now being hotly debated, including in the Joint Coordination Body. After intense debate over the size and structure of a future Afghan army, following the publication of two papers produced respectively by the International Security Assistance Force, which proposed a force of 50,000, and the Ministry of Defence, which suggested a force of 200,000, training of the first battalion of the new Afghan National Guard by International Security Assistance Force started on 17 February. The Ministry of Defence was asked to provide 20 men from each of Afghanistan's 32 provinces and to ensure that they reflected Afghanistan's ethnic balance. After a worryingly slow start and grossly imbalanced ethnic composition, the programme is now satisfactorily under way. The National Guard will be based primarily in Kabul and will be responsible for guarding the Presidential Palace and the ministries. The details of a larger training programme, led by the United States, are expected shortly, based on the results of a recent

visit to Kabul by an assessment team from United States Central Command.

63. The creation of a national army risks generating additional security problems rather than solving existing ones if: (a) the army is perceived as an instrument to further the political ambitions of one political group or military faction; and (b) a parallel programme is not put in place to provide alternative employment for those former combatants not selected to serve in the new army. In this respect, a programme for reintegration and demobilization, as opposed to the traditional sequence of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, appears to be best suited to the present situation in Afghanistan. This will require a concerted effort by donor countries, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and the international financial institutions to urgently identify and fund labour-intensive projects that target former combatants. My Special Representative and his deputy for relief, recovery and reconstruction, have initiated discussions on this issue with the Interim Authority, the International Security Assistance Force and the United Nations system, with the aim of making progress on it as soon as possible.

64. Meanwhile, authorities in Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat have been carrying out limited disarmament programmes. They are being conducted by the new police and security forces that have been formed in those cities. In Kandahar it was reported that some groups had resisted handing over their weapons, firing on the authorities. In Mazar-e-Sharif the number of armed people in the city has been substantially reduced; and in Khulm, Samangan province, where fighting recently took place, a special commission decided that all local commanders and their armed groups should be disarmed. By the end of February, 34 heavy weapons and 191 light weapons had been collected by the local police and stored in a depot. In Kabul, guns are supposed to be kept only if they are registered and the owner has a valid permit. People carrying weapons entering the city are required to deposit them with the police for the time of their stay in the capital. The police are planning a more thorough campaign involving house searches in the near future.

65. Deep suspicions remain, however, and it is said that powerful factions and local commanders are in fact disarming their adversaries as a means to actually arm more of their supporters. This is, in particular, a

complaint heard from many Pashtun groups in the north and west, who claim they are being disarmed and victimized by members of ethnic groups who are still armed.

66. I am particularly concerned by constraints in the traditional conditions of international assistance that make it difficult to meet the recurrent costs, salaries and benefits for the future Afghan military. The fact remains that if the military issues are not properly addressed and a genuine national security force is not established and paid regularly, the Bonn process risks being severely undermined. In a complex post-conflict situation, such as that in Afghanistan, proper management of the security sector is the necessary first step towards reconciliation and reconstruction; indeed, managing this sector may be considered the first reconstruction project.

The national police

67. The Interim Administration, and the Ministry of Interior in particular, recognizes that international assistance will be required to create, train and sustain an Afghan national police force. In this regard, they have requested the Government of Germany to lead a bilateral and multilateral effort, in the light of previous cooperation between Germany and Afghanistan in this field.

68. A meeting held on 13 February in Berlin to discuss international support for the Afghan police force was attended by representatives from 18 nations, including Afghanistan, and 11 international organizations, including United Nations agencies. Germany presented a report from a fact-finding mission it had dispatched to Kabul in January, and pledged 10 million euros in 2002 to support the Afghan police. This money would go towards training, including the provision of 11 instructors, the renovation of the police academy and reconstruction of police stations in Kabul. Some of the 50 police vehicles donated by the German Government have started to arrive in the capital. Other significant contributions were promised by Belgium, China, India, Norway, Pakistan and the Russian Federation. The United Kingdom has already provided communication equipment, uniforms and basic resources to the police in Kabul. Finally, the International Security Assistance Force is repairing police stations there.

69. A second donor meeting on the provision of international support to the Afghan police was held in Berlin on 14 and 15 March 2002, at which Germany presented an overall plan for the training of and support for reform of the Afghan police. A list of urgent requirements was distributed, and delegations were asked to respond with specific contributions. The first team of German police officers arrived in Kabul on 16 March, and the German Coordination Office began working in Kabul on 18 March.

70. With regard to support to the Interim Administration on the issue of drug control, Germany has indicated that the restructured Afghan police will include a strong and efficient drug-control unit. The United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) will continue to work with the Interim Administration on overall coordination related to internationally sponsored drug-control initiatives for Afghanistan.

71. In the meantime, the Ministry of Interior has presented a detailed plan for the reform and training of police. It established, on 3 March, a 15-member security committee, and is soon to establish a National Commission on Police Reform. The police academy has already initiated a course run by local instructors. The next focus, pending the availability of financial resources, will be on training 3,200 police officers (including 100 female officers) — 100 from each province.

72. The Bonn Agreement does not prescribe any role for the United Nations in the area of policing. The Civilian Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has, however, temporarily seconded one civilian police officer to the Office of the Special Representative in Kabul to liaise with the Interior Ministry and keep the Special Representative informed of plans being formulated by Governments engaged in bilateral assistance. The desirability and efficacy of any future United Nations role in this area can be evaluated only once sufficient details have been obtained on the extent to which bilateral efforts, under German coordination, can address the needs. Based on the plans presented in Berlin for training and reform of the Afghan police, I recommend an expansion of the United Nations police presence in UNAMA to a total of four police advisers. In close cooperation with the German team, and as requested by the Afghan Ministry of Interior, the four United Nations police advisers would have the following tasks, respectively: (a) to

advise the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on policing and security-related matters and to coordinate with other international agencies and Member States regarding support to the Afghan police; (b) to provide advice and assistance to the chiefs of departments in the Ministry of Interior, as well as to commissions and working groups established by the Ministry; (c) to work closely with the German police team and its Afghan counterparts on the recruitment and training of the Afghan police; and (d) to work closely with the Commander of the Kabul police on strategic and operational planning, and provide on-the-job advice to personnel in the Kabul police district, in close cooperation with the International Security Assistance Force.

IV. Humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction

73. The international focus on the Bonn process should not obscure the fact that millions of Afghans remain dependent on the United Nations for basic life-saving assistance. Humanitarian assistance has provided a vital lifeline to the country for the past two decades. The events of 11 September and their consequences profoundly challenged the United Nations and its partners to continue their assistance and to help prevent an even greater humanitarian catastrophe. Some six months later, it is clear that both challenges have been substantially met. This can be attributed in large part to the resilience of the Afghan people themselves, as well as to the dedication of the humanitarian assistance community and the generosity of international donors who responded to emergency appeals for funding and resources. There remains a need to continue a well-financed response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis for some time to come.

74. In responding to the crisis in Afghanistan, the United Nations and its partners had to overcome severe constraints. I particularly wish to pay tribute to the heroic efforts of thousands of Afghan relief workers who, especially after 11 September, remained at their posts and enabled agencies to furnish at least minimal levels of assistance in many areas. That said, poor security conditions have restricted access to much of the country and have left key vulnerable groups without assistance for several months. The gradual improvement in the security environment since mid-November has allowed humanitarian agencies to

expand their operations rapidly and to redeploy international staff to all major urban areas. Relief workers could also access many rural areas where a large number of people had sought refuge during the fighting.

75. Strengthened regional coordination arrangements and close cooperation with the States neighbouring Afghanistan also allowed agencies to significantly increase cross-border deliveries of humanitarian assistance. This has been especially important in the north, which is now receiving assistance through new border crossings with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

76. WFP delivered more than 115,000 tons of food in December alone, preventing widespread famine and further large-scale displacements during the winter months. Against considerable odds, it was able to deliver significant quantities of food to remote areas in the Central Highlands before bad weather made those areas inaccessible. WFP also conducted city-wide food distributions in Kabul, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif.

77. Despite these interventions, reports of malnutrition in many drought-affected areas and hitherto inaccessible mountainous and rural zones persist. I am very concerned that many lives could be lost, especially among vulnerable children, unless immediate remedial action is taken. Reports of micronutrient deficiencies suggest that the nutritional situation in Afghanistan is acute, and therefore requires an extraordinary and rapid response. WFP is implementing helicopter-assisted emergency food need assessments in remote but severely affected areas, and other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations have reinitiated nutrition surveys and targeted emergency feeding programmes. It is important to point out, however, that in many remote areas, banditry, lack of communication and poor or non-existent infrastructure continue to hamper relief efforts.

78. In concert with the Interim Administration, United Nations agencies and their partners have resumed most of the health services they had provided before September 2001. Currently, an estimated 70 per cent of the Afghan population is dependent on health services provided by the international community. UNICEF and the Ministry of Health have begun a countrywide measles immunization campaign, targeting more than 9 million children.

79. Landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to constitute a significant threat to the safety and security of the Afghan population and the international community, denying access to over 850 square kilometres of land and causing dozens of casualties every week. In response to this situation, the Mine Action Programme has been expanding its survey, clearance and awareness operations in the most affected parts of the country. All of the 15 partner non-governmental organizations are again conducting operations, with more than 90 per cent of mine action personnel back at work. Most organizations must replace substantial amounts of equipment lost during factional fighting, air strikes and looting. Key access routes and other high-priority areas have been cleared, allowing humanitarian assistance and returning refugees and internally displaced persons to reach an expanding number of areas. Mine action operations will continue to be an essential prerequisite to many of the humanitarian, recovery and reconstruction efforts being planned and implemented throughout the country.

80. The Salang tunnel, north of Kabul, was opened on 19 January by the Minister for Public Works. The tunnel was cleared by Russian Emergency Services and the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development, with the assistance of the Halo Trust. Although the tunnel is not yet fully operational and will require further repair, traffic, including trucks, has begun to flow again, boosting both humanitarian assistance efforts and trade with Central Asia.

81. More than 3.5 million Afghans currently live in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran as refugees. Upwards of 1 million people have been displaced within Afghanistan by conflict and drought. Since the beginning of this year, an estimated 47,000 new refugees have crossed into Baluchistan province in Pakistan, fleeing insecurity, ethnic tensions and the after-effects of drought. UNHCR has set up 19 new camps in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier province, which assist more than 230,000 refugees.

82. The Interim Administration has highlighted the importance of providing assistance to returning refugees and internally displaced persons (estimated to make up some 20 per cent of the country's population) and supporting their reintegration into their home communities. To better target assistance, humanitarian agencies have been re-registering and surveying refugee and internally displaced person populations to

determine where they come from and what their return plans are. Agencies have also been compiling profiles of districts of origin, ascertaining what physical assistance is needed and what protection concerns may exist (for example, in the case of minority groups). UNHCR, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Repatriation and the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, has been preparing to help up to 1.2 million refugees and internally displaced persons return to their homes in 2002. This requires creating a legal and operational framework in which repatriation can take place. Agreements are accordingly being negotiated with the Interim Administration and the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. The repatriation programme will also include the provision of transport, aid packages and shelter materials; the implementation of quick-impact projects to meet immediate needs in areas of return; and mechanisms to monitor returnees' protection requirements. So far this year, more than 250,000 people have returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since UNHCR opened its first voluntary repatriation centre near Peshawar on 1 March, refugees have been returning at a rate of 5,000 families per week.

83. Over the winter, agencies have been providing emergency assistance to internally displaced persons in areas of displacement. The focus is now, however, shifting towards providing assistance to areas of return. Since the beginning of this year, the United Nations and its partners have helped more than 30,000 internally displaced persons return from Kabul and the Panjshir Valley to the Shomali Plain.

84. The need for a strong and flexible United Nations humanitarian response capacity was highlighted in the past weeks by an earthquake measuring 7.2 on the Richter scale that shook much of Central Asia. While damage was lighter than in other recent earthquakes due to its depth, it nonetheless profoundly affected some communities, notably Khostak in the north-east, where 300 houses were destroyed, and Surkundar in the province of Samangan. Surkundar was struck by a massive landslide following the earthquake, which buried many homes, killed more than 100 people and displaced thousands more. The United Nations and its non-governmental organization partners have organized an emergency response to both Khostak and Surkundar, involving the provision of food, medical care and shelter. WFP, the United Nations Special Mission to

Afghanistan (UNSMA), and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs also facilitated a visit by Chairman Karzai to the affected area.

85. Adding to humanitarian concerns is the worrying resumption of poppy cultivation in the southern (Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan provinces) and eastern regions of Afghanistan. According to the results of a pre-assessment survey carried out by UNDCP in February, the production of opium this year is likely to be in the range of 1,900 to 2,700 tons. UNDCP will carry out a comprehensive survey between April and August and release the results in September.

86. Afghanistan will require massive amounts of international financial assistance for the foreseeable future in order to meet current humanitarian needs, initiate recovery and work towards the long-term reconstruction of the country. On 21 January, I attended the opening of the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo. It was attended by 61 countries and 21 international organizations. The delegation of the Interim Administration was led by Mr. Karzai. The Conference demonstrated its strong commitment to Afghanistan by committing \$1.8 billion for 2002 and more than \$4.5 billion over the next five years.

87. On 28 February, the United Nations and the Interim Authority launched an update to the Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan People 2002 in Kabul. On the same day I sent a letter to all Member States requesting that they contribute funds to this programme. The Programme contains United Nations and non-governmental organization projects requiring some \$1.18 billion and focusing on urgent humanitarian needs, immediate recovery projects and longer-term reconstruction and governance support. Common to all activities is the prioritization of capacity-building of the Afghan administration and civil society. The United Nations and the Interim Authority will continue to review projects on a sector-by-sector basis, based on national priorities and in cooperation with local authorities. Donors are strongly urged to support the highest priority projects and to work closely with the United Nations and the Interim Authority to ensure that resources are well-targeted and allocated quickly.

V. Current United Nations deployment in Afghanistan

88. My Special Representative arrived in Kabul on 21 December 2001 to begin carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to him in the Bonn Agreement and its annexes. He was accompanied by a small team from his immediate office (originally New York-based), consisting of a total of six international Professional-level officers and one personal assistant. He was joined by a small complement of staff from the existing United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan, whose international staff had been based in Islamabad. A technical survey team from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was deployed in Kabul to begin developing options for enhancing United Nations activities. Round-the-clock work in the preceding week by administrative and logistical support staff from the Office of Mission Support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations enabled this team to become fully functional, with complete communication and logistical support in place by 22 December.

89. Up until now, a number of factors have prohibited a rapid expansion of international staff in Afghanistan. First, security ceilings (covering staff from all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes) remain in place for Kabul and other major urban centres, restricting the total number of international United Nations staff that can deploy there at any one time. Such ceilings have been raised only recently, to 300 in Kabul, 60 in Mazar-e-Sharif, 70 in Herat, 45 in Kandahar, 30 in Jalalabad and 18 in Faizabad. Second, war damage and years of neglect have limited the number of premises available for accommodation.

90. The presence of international staff from the Office of my Special Representative and UNSMA is limited outside of Kabul to two political/civil affairs officers in Mazar-e-Sharif, one in Herat, one in Kandahar and another in Jalalabad. Security restrictions and logistical constraints remain in those cities, limiting the number of staff that can be deployed there.

91. The Office of the Special Representative and UNSMA presently have very limited capacity to monitor or assist in the implementation of the Bonn Agreement throughout the country. This is particularly troubling given the extent to which local dynamics and regional power bases are a factor in the political

environment of Afghanistan. What my Special Representative and his colleagues have accomplished thus far, under the circumstances, is truly remarkable.

92. The Office of the Special Representative and UNSMA staff are now based in a small house in Kabul, since the Taliban seized the UNSMA office building in June 2001. The Interim Administration has returned the building to the United Nations, but it has been severely damaged and needs extensive repair before it can be used again. In this regard, I am most grateful to the members of the Security Council and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for having made possible the provision of \$15 million that will enable such repairs to be undertaken, as well as allow for the provision of additional staff and equipment that will support the timely establishment of a new United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

93. All United Nations agencies, funds and programmes moved the centre of their activities from Islamabad to Kabul within several weeks of the installation of the Interim Administration. Their total deployment in Afghanistan remains constrained by security restrictions, as noted above. But all still maintain offices in Islamabad, which will be required for some time to come, as procurement, banking and other needs cannot yet be catered to in Kabul. A consolidation and streamlining of the Islamabad-based offices for Afghanistan is required, however, to minimize the duplication of overhead costs being incurred in both Kabul and Islamabad. This consolidation is in process.

VI. Proposed structure for the United Nations presence in Afghanistan: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

A. Mandate

94. As is evident from the information provided above, the United Nations has relied as much as possible on existing capacities in the region to support the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, while continuing its critical humanitarian and immediate recovery efforts. At the same time, given that all of these activities in one way or another affect the peace

process, it is essential that they be conducted in an integrated fashion.

95. My Special Representative already has an overall coordinating role for all United Nations activities in Afghanistan. The next step, to ensure that all United Nations efforts are harnessed to fully support the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, would be to integrate all the existing United Nations elements in Afghanistan into a single mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

96. Since the convening of the meeting at Bonn at the end of November, the entire United Nations system — at the Headquarters level as well as in the region — has been engaged in extensive consultations on the proposed structure and form of the United Nations presence in Afghanistan. Such discussions have been coordinated by the Integrated Mission Task Force for Afghanistan, and have been informed by active input from the members of the United Nations Development Group and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs and the Executive Committee on Peace and Security. A broad consensus within the entire United Nations system has now been achieved on how UNAMA should function.

97. Should the Security Council authorize its establishment, the core of the mission's mandate would entail:

(a) Fulfilling the tasks and responsibilities, including those related to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues, entrusted to the United Nations in the Bonn Agreement, which were endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 1383 (2001);

(b) Promoting national reconciliation and rapprochement throughout the country, through the good offices role of my Special Representative;

(c) Managing all United Nations humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, under the overall authority of my Special Representative and in coordination with the Interim Authority and successor administrations of Afghanistan.

B. Basic operating principles

98. The structure and initial size of UNAMA are proposed with the following basic operating principles in mind:

(a) It should be a unified, integrated structure under the authority and leadership of the Special Representative for Afghanistan. The planning and conduct of all United Nations activities in Afghanistan and the implementation of the UNAMA mandate must take place under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

(b) The overall objective of UNAMA should be to provide support for the implementation of the Bonn Agreement processes, including the stabilization of the emerging structures of the Afghan Interim Authority, while recognizing that the responsibility for the Agreement's implementation ultimately rests with the Afghans themselves;

(c) UNAMA should undertake close coordination and consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority and other Afghan actors to ensure that Afghan priorities lead the mission's assistance efforts;

(d) UNAMA should aim to bolster Afghan capacity (both official and non-governmental), relying on as limited an international presence and on as many Afghan staff as possible, and using common support services where possible, thereby leaving a light expatriate "footprint";

(e) UNAMA should have a unified presence and coordination capacity in regional offices and in selected high-priority provincial capitals, in addition to the Kabul-based headquarters;

(f) A rights-based and gender-sensitive approach would be integrated fully into the United Nations activities in Afghanistan;

(g) In all United Nations activities, special attention would have to be paid to vulnerable groups;

(h) Recovery and reconstruction efforts cannot await the successful conclusion of the peace process, but rather their early and effective delivery are central to the success of the process itself;

(i) Not all of the tasks that UNAMA may be asked to perform have yet been identified, as the next phases of the Bonn process will most probably offer new avenues for cooperation between the new authorities and the United Nations. The mission will therefore have to be developed in a phased manner (to also include the relevant expertise to support the electoral and constitutional processes outlined in the Bonn Agreement). This will depend on security

conditions, the extent of assistance provided bilaterally and through other international organizations and arrangements and the refinement of strategies by my Special Representative in the light of experience on the ground.

C. Proposed overall structure

99. In addition to an Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and an administrative and logistical support component, it is proposed that the mission have two main arms, or "pillars". Each of the two pillars would be headed by a Deputy Special Representative, at the rank of Assistant Secretary-General, reporting directly to my Special Representative. Both Deputy Special Representatives have been named: they are Jean Arnault, who would head the political affairs pillar, and Nigel Fisher, who would head the humanitarian and development pillar. The mission would be headquartered in Kabul, with regional offices based in seven cities: Bamiyan, Gardez, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and one city in the north-east. Liaison offices would be maintained in Islamabad, Tehran and possibly one or two additional cities of neighbouring countries, in recognition of the regional dimension of the Afghan conflict.

100. The mission would not have any uniformed personnel, with the exception of a few advisers on military and civilian police matters, and a few lightly armed international personnel required to provide close protection.

D. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

101. The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would initially build on the current complement of staff already on board, and would consist of the following: a Director of Office/Chief of Staff; special assistants; a Military Advisory Unit to liaise with the International Security Assistance Force; and a Legal Unit (for traditional United Nations-related legal matters — including issues related to privileges and immunities, status-of-mission agreements and contractual obligations — as opposed to domestic rule-of-law-related matters).

102. It would also have an Office of Communication and Public Information, which would carry out the public information work of the mission, eventually including media relations, video and photo coverage, production or co-production of radio programmes, development of publications, maintenance of the web site and public outreach activities. The Spokesperson, who would head the Office, would speak for the entire mission. The Office would also support the development of a national media capacity, working in conjunction with the Interim Authority and bilateral and multilateral assistance efforts.

103. Human rights and gender issues will be central to the purposes and functions of the mission. The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would, in addition, require advisory expertise in those areas that cut across all aspects of the mission's work, in the areas of human rights, the rule of law (judicial, police and penal system) and gender equality. The mission's approach in those areas would especially rely on the lead set by the Human Rights and Judicial Commissions, as well as by the Ministry for Women's Affairs, for which the UNAMA advisers in those areas (mainly Afghan nationals) should provide daily support and assistance. Each adviser would coordinate mission-wide activities in his or her respective area. Senior human rights, judicial and gender advisers in the Office of the Special Representative would provide the necessary guidance and direction to staff in both pillars of the mission to ensure that a rights-based and gender-sensitive approach was applied in all aspects of the mission's work.

E. Pillar I: political affairs

104. Pillar I would be headed by a Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs. The tasks of the pillar would be as follows:

(a) Monitoring, analysing and reporting on the overall political and human rights situation and status of implementation of the Bonn Agreement, especially as related to the environment for the convening of the emergency *loya jirga*;

(b) Supporting the work of the Special Independent Commission for the Emergency *loya jirga*;

(c) Maintaining contact with Afghan leaders, political parties, civil society groups, institutions and representatives of the central authorities;

(d) Maintaining contact with representatives of the international community;

(e) Performing good offices as necessary on behalf of the Special Representative and in support of the efforts of the legitimate Afghan authorities, particularly in the fields of conflict control, confidence-building and reconciliation;

(f) Providing information and guidance on political issues for the benefit of other UNAMA activities;

(g) Investigating human rights violations and, where necessary, recommending corrective action.

105. In the initial phase, pillar I would consist of approximately 30 to 40 international political/civil affairs officers, based at mission headquarters in Kabul and deployed in small teams (of up to four officers) to each of the seven regions. The international political/civil affairs officers in the regions would be supported by teams of national staff, who would assist in maintaining contact at the district and local levels throughout the country. The existing political and civil affairs capacity of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan would be absorbed into this pillar, immediately upon the establishment of UNAMA.

F. Pillar II: relief, recovery and reconstruction

106. Pillar II of UNAMA would be headed by a Deputy Special Representative for Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction, who would perform the functions of Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, as well as being the designated official responsible for the security of United Nations personnel in Afghanistan. The Deputy Special Representative would be responsible for the direction and oversight of United Nations relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, including the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, and of the offices, agencies, funds and programmes undertaking those activities. The Deputy Special Representative would coordinate an integrated and principled United Nations assistance programme that both informed and was informed by the political and civil affairs work conducted under pillar I. The Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General would ensure a strategic partnership with the Interim Administration

and with the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority in particular, and would directly assist the Administration in articulating a national development framework and in coordinating international assistance to ensure that such assistance was strategically targeted and supportive of immediate and longer-term national priorities.

107. The tasks of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction, in overseeing pillar II, would be:

(a) To articulate a strategic vision for the United Nations assistance role in Afghanistan that responds to the immediate needs of the most vulnerable populations, is supportive of national recovery and reconstruction priorities and is rights-based and gender-sensitive;

(b) To develop an integrated United Nations assistance programme that builds on the comparative advantages, capacities, experience and mandates of the United Nations assistance community to monitor performance and to ensure accountability against established standards of performance, giving special attention to measures promoting women's rights and the achievement of the rights of the most disadvantaged and underserved populations and ethnic groups;

(c) To ensure that United Nations assistance supports capacity-building in counterpart Afghan administrations and organizations at the national and subnational levels to develop policy-making, planning, management, assessment and coordination capabilities. To achieve this goal, all United Nations entities would be expected to provide technical, material and financial support to counterpart administration departments;

(d) To create, with the Interim Administration and other partners, an effective programme information and data management system that builds on the Afghanistan Information Management Service to provide necessary information, in a user-friendly form, on programme coverage, performance and financing, through a range of communication channels, to actors at the national and subnational levels and to donors and partners in the international community. The information and data management facility would be a semi-autonomous United Nations-funded facility, managed by a client board (Interim Authority, United Nations, non-governmental organization and donor

representation) co-located with the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority;

(e) To ensure that the national and subnational activities of United Nations offices, agencies, funds and programmes are conducted efficiently, cost-effectively, in a coordinated manner and in cooperation with other actors — governmental, non-governmental, private sector and international — as appropriate. All such United Nations actors would be expected to make a transition to a predominant reliance on qualified national personnel, from all ethnic groups and including women, and would be expected to initiate internal capacity-development activities to achieve that end. Efforts would also be made to reduce overhead and to ensure the application of common services, systems and facilities wherever possible;

(f) To assign, in agreement with the national administration, thematic and sectoral lead coordination responsibilities to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, as appropriate, which would support counterpart departments to oversee and coordinate all actors — national and international — and activities in each sector, to ensure actions that are coherent and responsive to needs, problems and change, to ensure standardized monitoring and reporting on progress and performance against established targets and standards of performance and to ensure regular information flows between actors, the administration and the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

(g) To oversee, guide and support regional relief, recovery and reconstruction coordinators in the regional UNAMA offices, enabling them to ensure coherent United Nations agency capacity-development support to local counterpart authorities and other partners, to ensure cross-sectoral coordination and problem solving, to monitor and report on United Nations thematic and sectoral activities, to ensure two-way information flows between the capital and peripheral locations and to ensure mutually supportive interface between pillar I and pillar II activities at the subnational level;

(h) To represent the United Nations assistance community to the international and donor communities, to ensure appropriate integrated reporting on the overall performance of the United Nations assistance community, to ensure timely reporting to United Nations bodies as necessary, to mobilize resources for relief, recovery and rehabilitation programmes, to

support the resource mobilization priorities of the Interim Administration and successor administrations and to manage common emergency trust funds.

108. In the initial phase, pillar II would consist of a total of approximately 50 international personnel, based at mission headquarters in Kabul or in the seven regional offices, and also including up to 10 international staff located in the semi-autonomous information and data management facility mentioned above. Subsequently, some Professional staff may be deployed to the provincial level on a selective basis. The existing functions and capacity of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan would be absorbed into UNAMA, as required, once the new mission was established.

G. Inter-pillar coordination at the regional level

109. While my Special Representative and his Director of Office/Chief of Staff would ensure inter-pillar coordination at the mission headquarters level, it is equally vital to ensure that all United Nations staff deployed in the regions work together in a fully coordinated and integrated manner. To this end, all UNAMA elements, including all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, shall operate within common regional boundaries and headquarters (which is not presently the case). Moreover, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall designate, based on seniority and experience, either the senior political/civil affairs officer or the senior coordinator of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction in a particular region to concurrently serve as the UNAMA Regional Representative. The Regional Representative's role would be to serve as the senior representative of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the regions, vis-à-vis national and international actors, as well as to ensure inter-pillar cooperation and coordination.

H. Mission support concept for the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

110. The timely creation of a unified mission is key to the support of the mission's operational goals. The creation of an integrated structure would be phased in.

The first step would be the unification of the administrative components of UNSMA and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. This would streamline the provision of administrative and logistical support to the core of UNAMA. In addition, current United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan staff and assets would be integrated. Together, these actions would lay the foundation for UNAMA as a unified presence making the greatest use of common services.

111. The mission support component of UNAMA would comprise around 100 international mission support staff, headed by a Chief Administrative Officer at the D-1 level. Once fully deployed, some 50 mission support staff would be based in Kabul, with up to seven mission support staff (including security officers) deployed to each of the seven regional offices. The deployment to the regions would be gradual and phased.

112. Mission support staff must be deployed quickly to ensure that essential capacities are in place and ready to support the expansion of the mission's operations. To maintain the relatively lean structure of the mission, support activities would be provided at the minimum level needed to sustain safe and responsive operations. Mission support capacity would be required, inter alia, to provide a full range of human resources support services to international and local staff; to procure goods and services; to coordinate the engineering work needed to refurbish buildings; and to provide support in areas ranging from communications to finance, transport and logistics, and first-line medical treatment. In cases where the mission support capacity requires enhancement, temporary deployments of small groups of staff from other field missions would be undertaken. Considerable use would be made of air transport to enhance security and flexibility, reduce travelling time, provide a medical evacuation capacity and ease the delivery of humanitarian and developmental assistance. To enhance the provision of medical care, Member States providing medical support to the International Security Assistance Force would be requested to extend medical treatment to UNAMA staff.

113. To enable the mission to make maximum use of local capacities, a training element must be established to promote and develop skills in areas ranging from English language to vehicle and communications equipment servicing. With effective training, the

number of international mission support staff could be reduced as the number of trained Afghan staff increased.

114. UNAMA would make maximum efforts to co-locate staff and resources in both Kabul and the regions. Co-location would facilitate the provision of common services. To assist this effort, the Interim Administration would be called upon to make appropriate buildings available to UNAMA. Those buildings may be renovated, using local labour and materials, for the mission's use. Co-location would also be key to ensuring adequate security for staff. In this regard, a comprehensive plan will be developed to address the requirements for both office and living accommodations.

115. The detailed needs assessment and preparation of budgetary estimates will proceed as the mission is being established. This will entail coordination with other agencies.

VII. Observations

116. Afghanistan is a shattered society. The participants in the Bonn Conference have set for the leaders and people of their country the formidable challenge of consolidating the peace process in less than three years. But it will take much more than 36 months to heal the wounds left by 23 years of war. The process of healing has started, however, and Afghans and members of the international community must be careful not to allow that process to reverse itself. This requires from all a continued commitment and determination to stay the course. It also requires that realistic and achievable objectives be set. Afghanistan is a desperately poor country, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. However, it now has the chance at least to be a country at peace with its neighbours and itself.

117. Few would have imagined in October 2001 that the Taliban regime's collapse could so quickly be followed by the installation of an internationally recognized Interim Administration. This Administration may not have much in the way of material support or finances, but in the less than three months of its existence its ministers are regularly meeting and discussing issues, making decisions and, under the leadership of Chairman Karzai, very ably representing Afghanistan on the world stage.

118. The Interim Administration has already established sufficient international credibility and

legitimacy that donors, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations alike are firmly committed to following its lead in helping to administer life-saving assistance, restore basic services around the country and work towards formulating a national development framework.

119. Boys and girls are at last returning to school by the hundreds of thousands. Women, who have been denied fundamental and basic needs, are being employed by international organizations, government ministries, hospitals, schools, and even, in small numbers, the police. The pace of such employment is far from ideal, and much remains to be done, including exercising vigilance and monitoring constantly to ensure that women's rights are not ignored or neglected. At the same time, the present situation stands in stark contrast to the conditions that existed less than six months ago.

120. Notwithstanding the fact that Afghanistan's infrastructure has been destroyed and its people devastated by almost a quarter-century of war, Afghans from all walks of life stand ready to assume responsibility themselves for rebuilding their country. There are millions of Afghans, within the country and in the diaspora, who are educated, capable, motivated and willing to face the challenges ahead. They now need the international community's material and financial assistance to get on with the job, free from the external interference that has undermined Afghanistan's sovereignty for far too long. In this regard, I urge donors, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to significantly expedite funding and programme delivery so that the benefits of peace may be visible to all concerned immediately, and that the domestic credibility of the Interim Administration can be extended throughout the country — especially outside of Kabul.

121. A critical turning point in the peace process will be the convening of the emergency *loya jirga*, which must occur before 22 June 2002, according to the provisions of the Bonn Agreement. That will be a major political event, and soon political jockeying will start among all political actors, including the old guard as well as military commanders and civil society. It is vitally important that the legitimate political aspirations of individuals and groups be pursued peacefully, constructively and in free and fair conditions, so as not to erode the credibility and legitimacy of the process. To that end, it is equally

important that peace be preserved, and for that to happen the people of Afghanistan must mobilize their efforts, and the international community must remain fully engaged and supportive. Any prospective troublemakers must be made to realize that they will find no sympathy at home and no support abroad.

122. If the emergency *loya jirga* can be successfully convened as scheduled, and if the Transitional Administration selected by the *loya jirga* can be peacefully installed and domestically accepted thereafter, then the risk of a resumption of war should be greatly reduced.

123. Unfortunately, risks to the peace process remain ever-present today. The recent round of fighting between the coalition forces and al-Qa'idah and Taliban fighters in the south-eastern region brings to the forefront a number of fundamental questions. How many al-Qa'idah and Taliban fighters are still in Afghanistan? How strong is their determination to continue to fight a losing battle? Who is helping them, and why? Where are those who left Afghanistan and how many are they? What are their plans? And, more to the point within the context of the present report, what threat do al-Qa'idah members remaining in Afghanistan and their supporters pose to the peace process? While answers to some of these questions may remain elusive, they cannot be wished away. It is for this reason that the peace process must be consolidated and the authority of the central government extended to all parts of the country. The only way to ensure the eradication of terrorism from Afghan soil is by empowering the countries' legitimate authorities to police their own territory.

124. Sadly, the risks to the peace process do not come only from terrorist groups. As a consequence of decades of war, mutual suspicion and mistrust continue to exist between old rivals. All must be made to understand that the only option in the new Afghanistan is patient and tolerant work to establish mutual trust and confidence so that all disputes are resolved through compromise and other peaceful means.

125. Let me further remind all concerned of the dynamics that plunged Afghanistan back into war in 1992. Where the symptoms of that bitter past have emerged, they must be dealt with rapidly. Where they have not emerged, they must not be allowed to do so. This is particularly the case in the capital, where the successful installation of the Interim Administration

and the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force have helped to improve the situation dramatically. But even here there should be no room for complacency.

126. Security is and will remain the essential requirement for the protection of the peace process. Consequently, the Afghans are unanimous in considering security as their first and most important need. This view is reflected by Chairman Karzai, who has repeatedly called for the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force to other parts of the country. Afghans and most close observers of the Afghan political scene are confident that such a geographic expansion to a number of major urban centres would significantly minimize the likelihood of large-scale hostilities erupting again between existing armed factions.

127. I cannot emphasize enough that, whatever form of security assistance the Security Council and Member States should decide to provide to Afghanistan at this, its hour of need, speed is of the essence.

128. Speed is of the essence, too, in helping to build the indigenous security sector — in particular the Afghan military and civilian police forces. Without a credible national security apparatus in the short and longer term, all that has been achieved to date could unravel quickly. Moreover, without security today, the billions of dollars pledged for Afghanistan's reconstruction will be of little use tomorrow.

129. The proposed mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, under the leadership of my Special Representative, is intended to ensure that all forms of United Nations assistance — political, human rights and rule of law, gender, relief, recovery and reconstruction — are channelled towards supporting the implementation of the peace process by the Afghan people. The proposed structure and size of the mission is relatively lean. This is precisely so that the Organization's overhead costs do not consume too much of the overall aid destined for the people of Afghanistan, and so that the presence of too many international staff does not overwhelm the nascent Interim Administration by creating conflicting demands.

130. However, UNAMA will not be able to carry out its functions effectively unless the security situation is addressed immediately. This responsibility lies with Member States that are in a position to lend the

necessary assistance and that have the means to do so. Countries around the world have stated that, this time, they will not abandon the people of Afghanistan. The opportunity now presents itself for them to show the Afghans that they mean what they say.

131. Likewise, Afghan leaders must not forget that donors and troop contributors will be more receptive to appeals for assistance if they are convinced that Afghans are doing as much as they can to help themselves. On this note, I urge Afghan leaders to recognize that dialogue and compromise with political rivals does not require financial assistance from the international community. It requires nothing less and nothing more than the will and the courage to transcend ethnic and regional parochialism in favour of genuine national unity and lasting peace.

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year**Letter dated 14 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative of
Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I wish to draw your attention to the latest attacks against Israelis committed as part of the continuing Palestinian campaign of terrorism.

On Tuesday afternoon, 12 March, terrorist set up an ambush on a hilltop near Kibbutz Matzuva and opened fire and hurled grenades at Israeli vehicles travelling along Route 70, a road in northern Israel not far from the Lebanese border. The gunmen, who were wearing IDF uniforms, killed six Israelis and wounded seven others before they were stopped by security forces. The Al Aksa Brigades, the terrorist wing of Chairman Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction, claimed responsibility for the attack. Israel is also investigating the possibility that the perpetrators originated in Lebanon.

Earlier on Tuesday, terrorists opened fire on an Israeli vehicle travelling near the community of Kiryat Sefer. One Israeli civilian — Eyal Lieberman, age 45 — was killed in the attack and one other was injured.

Last night, Yosef Yitzhak Primo, age 40, was stabbed in the chest by two masked Palestinians who knocked on the door of his home in Nahliel shortly before 9 p.m. (local time). His wife opened the door and the terrorists burst in and stabbed Primo, who was moderately injured in the attack.

These attacks represent the latest developments in the ongoing campaign of Palestinian terrorism directed against the citizens of the State of Israel. Previous attacks have been detailed in my letters dated 5 March 2002 (A/56/857-S/2002/233), 4 March 2002 (A/56/854-S/2002/222), 27 February 2002 (A/56/843-S/2002/208), 20 February 2002 (A/56/828-S/2002/185), 19 February 2002 (A/56/824-S/2002/174), 11 February 2002 (A/56/819-S/2002/164), 8 February 2002 (A/56/814-S/2002/155), 28 January 2002 (A/56/798-S/2002/126), 22 January 2002 (A/56/788-S/2002/104), 18 January 2002 (A/56/781-S/2002/86), 16 January 2002 (A/56/774-S/2002/73), 11 January 2002 (A/56/771-S/2002/47), 4 January 2002 (A/56/766-S/2002/25), 13 December 2001 (A/56/706-S/2001/1198), 4 December 2001 (A/56/678-S/2001/1150), 30 November 2001 (A/56/670-S/2001/1141), 27 November 2001



(A/56/663-S/2001/1121), 12 November 2001 (A/56/617-S/2001/1071), 5 November 2001 (A/56/604-S/2001/1048), 24 October 2001 (A/56/506-S/2001/1011), 19 October 2001 (A/56/492-S/2001/990), 17 October 2001 (A/56/483-S/2001/975), 8 October 2001 (A/56/450-S/2001/948), 5 October 2001 (A/56/444-S/2001/943), 3 October 2001 (A/56/438-S/2001/938), 24 September 2001 (A/56/406-S/2001/907), 20 September 2001 (A/56/386-S/2001/892), 17 September 2001 (A/56/367-S/2001/875), 7 September 2001 (A/56/346-S/2001/858), 4 September 2001 (A/56/331-S/2001/840), 30 August 2001 (A/56/325-S/2001/834), 27 August 2001 (A/56/324-S/2001/825), 13 August 2001 (A/56/294-S/2001/787), 9 August 2001 (A/56/286-S/2001/780), 8 August 2001 (A/56/280-S/2001/775), 6 August 2001 (A/56/272-S/2001/768), 27 July 2001 (A/56/225-S/2001/743), 26 July 2001 (A/56/223-S/2001/737), 17 July 2001 (A/56/201-S/2001/706), 13 July 2001 (A/56/184-S/2001/696), 3 July 2001 (A/56/138-S/2001/662), 2 July 2001 (A/56/131-S/2001/656), 21 June 2001 (A/56/119-S/2001/619), 19 June 2001 (A/56/98-S/2001/611), 18 June 2001 (A/56/97-S/2001/604), 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001 (A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108) and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

Despite the repeated condemnations of Palestinian terror attacks, there are no signs that Chairman Arafat is prepared to take any concerted action that would bring such acts to an end. Rather, the only signs emerging from the Palestinian side are the continued incitement in the official media and the proud claims of responsibility from forces affiliated with Chairman Arafat's Fatah faction following their latest deadly assault on Israeli civilians. These attacks result from the extensive terrorist infrastructure that has taken root in the Palestinian territories and from the unwillingness of the Palestinian leadership to fulfil its obligations to prevent acts of violence against civilians.

Israel is committed to achieving a cessation of violence and to proceeding towards the implementation of the Mitchell Report and the Tenet work plan as called for in Security Council resolution 1397 (2002). The success of an enduring ceasefire will require that the Palestinian leadership act against the terrorist organizations that continue to carry out deadly attacks on a daily basis. The international community must facilitate this process by reaffirming the absolute unacceptability of any acts of violence that deliberately target civilians. Achieving a cessation of violence will enable the parties to progress towards the resumption of a bilateral negotiating process in an atmosphere conducive to producing a final settlement to the conflict in the region.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Lancry
Permanent Representative



**General Assembly
Security Council**

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda items 41 and 42

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Question of Palestine

The situation in the Middle East

**Letter dated 14 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative of
Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit the text of a statement by the press secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus concerning the adoption of Security Council resolution 1397 (2002) on the situation in the Middle East (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 41 and 42, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Sergei Ling**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 14 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the press secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus concerning the adoption of the Security Council resolution on the situation in the Middle East

The Republic of Belarus welcomes the adoption on 12 March 2002 of Security Council resolution 1397 (2002) concerning the situation in the Middle East, including the question of Palestine.

The vision of the Middle East approved by the Security Council as a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, will peacefully coexist within secure and recognized borders, is in keeping with the position of the Republic of Belarus on the Middle East conflict.

We fully support the demand made in the resolution for the immediate cessation of violence, including terrorist acts, and the call to the parties to the conflict to cooperate in the implementation of the Tenet plan and the Mitchell report with the aim of resuming peace negotiations on a political settlement.

The Republic of Belarus believes that the adoption of the Security Council resolution, which is positively regarded both by the Palestinians and by the Israelis, is a significant contribution by the international community to the process of the peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict.

14 March 2002



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Fifty-sixth session

Agenda item 84

**Review of the implementation of the Declaration
on the Strengthening of International Security**

Security Council

Fifty-seventh year

**Letter dated 17 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative
of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General**


I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter dated 16 March 2002 from Kamal Kharrazi, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, addressed to you (see annex). In the letter, the Foreign Minister reflects the concerns of the Iranian Government over the reports indicating that the United States of America is planning to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons and contemplating nuclear strikes against a list of non-nuclear States.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 84, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hadi **Nejad-Hosseinian**

Ambassador

Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 17 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On 10 March 2002, excerpts from a report entitled "Nuclear Posture Review", prepared by the United States Department of Defense, were published in the United States, which indicate the emergence of a new doctrine in the United States on the use of nuclear weapons.

While the document remains classified, statements on the record by various high-ranking officials of the United States Administration indicate that action plans are being devised to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons and improve the existing ones to be used against nuclear- as well as non-nuclear-weapon States.

This doctrine is a clear violation of the United States multilateral obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and contradicts previous assurances officially undertaken by the United States at the highest level. This constitutes an alarming development which threatens to undermine the global non-proliferation regime.

It is important to recall that, in the early 1980s, all five nuclear-weapon States, in response to the international demand for a treaty on negative security assurances against nuclear weapons, undertook not to use such weapons against States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and those which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons.

On 9 February 1982, the United States representative to the Committee on Disarmament stated: "The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack".

On 5 April 1995, days before the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, this pledge was reaffirmed through a statement by the United States Secretary of State and circulated as document A/50/153-S/1995/263.

This pledge was taken at face value both in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 and in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference decision 2 on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

In paragraphs 1 and 2 of its resolution 984 (1995), the Security Council took note of the statements by the nuclear-weapon States "in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" and recognized "the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to receive assurances that the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, will act immediately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in the event that such States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used".

In the eighth principle and objective contained in decision 2 on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which extended the Treaty indefinitely, the Conference took note of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) as well as "the declarations of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances" and stipulated that "further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument".

The new United States doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons is in clear violation of the commitments which were made and reaffirmed to help the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, under article VI of the Treaty, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament constitute the undertaking of each of the Parties to the Treaty and it is self-evident that the nuclear-weapon States have a crucial role to play in this process.

The demand of the international community in its entirety for nuclear disarmament has been reflected in numerous documents adopted by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences, the General Assembly and other forums. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice has articulated the legal obligation to continue the endeavours for nuclear disarmament in good faith.

The 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference called for "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI". It called upon them to consider "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination".

The new United States doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons not only shifts back towards a new era of nuclear arms race, but also expands the role of nuclear weapons to conventional conflicts and even non-belligerent non-nuclear-weapon States.

There has been a growing trend within the current United States Administration to undermine multilateral efforts aimed at addressing global menaces ranging from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to environmental degradation. This trend is a cause for grave concern which requires urgent and resolute universal attention and response.

Kamal Kharrazi
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran